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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the relationship between corruption and sustainable development in a sample 
of 110 countries between 1996 and 2007.  Sustainability is measured by growth in genuine 
wealth per capita. The empirical analysis consistently finds that cross-national measures of 
perceived and experienced corruption reduce growth in genuine wealth per capita. In contrast to 
the evidence on the relationship between corruption and growth in GDP per capita, the negative 
correlation between a wide range of different corruption indices and growth in genuine wealth 
per capita is very robust and is of economic as well as of statistical significance. We relate the 
finding to the literature on the resource curse and demonstrate that rampant corruption can put an 
economy on an unsustainable path along which its capital base is being eroded.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Corruption in its various forms is generally believed to be an obstacle to economic 
development.3 Anti-corruption reforms and policies consequently offer great promise to 
                                                 
1Chapter prepared for “International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume 2,” Susan Rose-Ackerman 
and Tina Søreide, eds., 2011 (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar). Critical comments from Stephane Straub, Susan 
Rose-Ackerman and from workshop participants at Yale are greatly appreciated.  
2Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, CB3 9DD Cambridge, U.K. Phone: +44(0) 1223 335231; Fax: 
+44(0)1223 335375. E-mail: tsa23@econ.cam.ac.uk  
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contribute to the wellbeing of millions of people. The seminal paper by Mauro (1995), which 
spurred a large empirical literature4, concluded that “if Bangladesh were to improve the integrity 
and efficiency of its bureaucracy to the level of that of Uruguay.... its yearly GDP growth rate 
would rise by over half a percentage point” (p. 683). Yet, in subsequent work on macroeconomic 
data, it has proved hard to find robust evidence that corruption, as opposed to general 
government inefficiency, has a sizable negative effect on growth in real GDP per capita (see, 
e.g., Aidt, 2009). On the other hand, the evidence of a strong negative correlation between the 
level of GDP per capita and corruption is overwhelming, but a priori the direction of causality is 
unclear. Murphy et al. (1993), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Lambsdorff (2007) and many others see 
the causality as running from high corruption to low income, while Treisman (2000) and Paldam 
(2002), amongst others, argue that a transition from a situation with high corruption to one with 
low corruption is a bi-product of economic development. In a recent paper, Gundlach and 
Paldam (2009a) use deep prehistoric measures of biogeography as instruments for GDP per 
capita to demonstrate that the long-run causality runs from low levels of development to high 
corruption, thus suggesting that the reverse link between a high level of corruption and low 
national income is, at most, part of the short-run dynamics of development. 
 
While the insights from the research program on the GDP-corruption nexus are valuable and 
important for one’s understanding of the macroeconomics of corruption, there is a sense in which 
that research programme is barking up the wrong tree. Policy advice should ideally be guided by 
considerations of social welfare. GDP per capita is a poor indicator of that concept. It measures 
current economic activity, but ignores many key determinants of human well-being (e.g., social 
relations, health, and personal safety), the possible destruction of natural capital in the quest for 
higher incomes, the value of home production, etc. In other words, research should be directed at 
questions related to sustainable development rather than economic development, narrowly 
defined. Sustainable development relates to an economy's ability to maintain living standards 
through time; growth in GDP per capita is no guarantee for long-run sustainability.  
                                                                                                                                                             
3 There is a dissenting view which contends that corruption can, in some restricted sense, be efficiency-enhancing 
by allowing economic agents to overcome pre-existing, inefficient regulation and red tape (e.g., Leff, 1964; Levy, 
2007). Macro-level evidence pointing in this direction is provided by e.g., Méon and Weill (2010), Méndez and 
Sepúlveda (2006) and Egger and Winner (2005). Critical discussions of this view are presented in e.g., Aidt (2009), 
and the surveys by Bardhan (1997) or Aidt (2003). 
4E.g. Mo (2001) and the survey by Svensson (2005)   
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In recent years, progress has been made in constructing empirical measures of social welfare and 
sustainable development. Fleurbaey (2009), in a recent survey in the Journal of Economic 
Literature, highlights three main approaches to the measurement of social welfare: adjusted 
GDP, happiness indices, and the Human Development Index based on Sen’s capability 
approach.5 Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages. The happiness approach, 
which is based on survey evidence aimed at eliciting information concerning subjective well-
being, suffers from serious problems of comparability across time and space.6 The Human 
Development Index, which is an index of social welfare constructed from averages of GDP per 
capita and indicators of health and education outcomes, faces the so-called “index problem”: if a 
single index is defined that weights different aspects of life in the same way for all individuals, 
then these common weights do not respect the individuals’ own valuations of these aspects. The 
adjusted GDP approach is based firmly on welfare economics and aims to derive indicators of 
the change in social welfare, rather than measures of the level of welfare as such. The most 
sophisticated indicators focus explicitly on the inter-temporal dimension of social welfare and 
can, in contrast, to the other measures, address issues related to sustainable development directly 
(Dasgupta, 2001, chapter 9; Dasgupta, 2010). The basic insight provided is that an economy’s 
capital stocks, broadly defined to include manufactured, human, social and natural capital, and 
the way in which these are managed, matter for the inter-temporal well-being of individuals. 
Moreover, changes in inter-temporal social welfare can be measured by variations in these stocks 
at current accounting prices or by variations in what is called “genuine investment”. Although 
this approach also suffers from conceptual weaknesses (e.g., it is based on the theory of revealed 
preference) and practical implementation problems (e.g., the capability of one measurement to 
compare accounting prices across economies), these issues seem less of an obstacle for empirical 
research than those associated with the alternatives. For this reason, we argue that genuine 
investment, and the associated growth in genuine wealth per capita, is the best available indicator 
of sustainable development. We shall use such measures to revisit the macroeconomics of the 
corruption-development nexus, but with an emphasis on sustainable development, rather than on 
more narrowly-defined economic development. 
                                                 
5 He also considers a fourth approach, which is a synthesis of the others. 
6 The approach has, nonetheless, been used to illuminate many important links between economic fundamentals, 
institutions, and human wellbeing (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002). 
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Development is, however, not the only concept that it is hard to quantify empirically. It is 
equally difficult to construct reliable and accurate measures of corruption (Jain (2001) provides a 
good discussion). Most macroeconomic research explores cross-national differences in 
corruption perceptions. It is well-known that such perceptions may be biased and directly related 
to prevailing economic and social conditions and, in that way, create a spurious correlation 
between corruption and economic development. This suspicion is recently confirmed by 
Treisman (2007) and Aidt (2009). Treisman (2007) compares the determinants of corruption 
perceptions to the determinants of indicators of individuals’ self-reported experiences with bribe 
giving (“experienced corruption”). He finds that many of the traditional determinants of 
corruption perceptions do not correlate well with indices of experienced corruption. Aidt (2009) 
re-examines the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and corruption and finds that the 
correlation between indices of experienced corruption and growth in GDP per capita is 
practically zero. This strongly suggests that the neither the causes nor the consequences of 
perceived and experienced corruption are the same. However, survey-based indices of 
experienced corruption also suffer from many weaknesses (e.g. related to selective non-
response), and so neither of the two types of measures are perfect. We take the view here that the 
way forward is to study both types of indicators and, in that way, gauge the robustness of any 
relationship between corruption (measured by a variety of means) and sustainable development. 
 
The contribution of this Chapter is to revisit the classical macroeconomic question of the impact 
of corruption on development, but from a new angle. First, we inquire into the effect of 
corruption on sustainable development, as opposed to more narrowly-defined economic 
development. Second, we study the role of corruption perceptions as well as the role of 
individuals’ self-reported experience with corruption. We find that corruption, by whatever 
means it is measured, is detrimental to sustainable development in a sample of up to 110 
countries covering the period 1996 to 2007.  This correlation is robust across many different 
specifications in contrast with the literature on GDP growth and corruption. Although, the World 
Bank has published estimates of genuine investment for a number of years, only a small number 
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of studies7 have used them to study potential links between economic, social, and political 
factors and sustainable development.  
  
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses sustainable development in more detail 
and its links with corruption. Section 3 discusses the measurement problems associated with 
quantifying corruption. Section 4 takes a first look at the data and demonstrates a suggestive 
(negative) correlation between corruption and sustainable development. Section 5 sets out the 
estimation strategy while Section 6 presents the main results. We report results from a pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, from a Hausman-Taylor random effects estimator, and 
from an instrumental variables approach. Section 7 summarizes the robustness checks 
implemented in the study, and Section 8 concludes the Chapter with ideas for further research 
and thoughts on policy implications. 
   
 
2. Sustainable development 
 
Most of the empirical research on the consequences of corruption at the economy-wide level uses 
real GDP per capita to measure development. Ultimately, development is concerned with 
sustainable improvements in human welfare. It is widely recognized that GDP per capita is not 
necessarily a good measure of such improvements. In a nutshell, the problem is that GDP per 
capita is a flow variable. It records, at market prices, the value of the goods and services 
produced by an economy in a given year. This flow can, however, be increased over a period of 
time by running down an economy's capital stocks – for example, its reserves of renewable and 
non-renewable resources, or its stock of human capital – but with the consequence that these 
stocks of capital are then partly lost for the future. It is, therefore, quite possible that an observed 
increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita over a period of time may correspond to a fall in 
inter-temporal social welfare when the consequences for future generations are considered. This 
implies that we must look to other measures to assess the effects of corruption on sustainable 
development. 
                                                 
7See Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) and Neumayer (2004). 
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2.1.  Framework and concepts 
 
Sustainable development is loosely defined as present economic paths that do not compromise 
the well-being of future generations (World Commission, 1997). Arrow et al. (2004) propose a 
more precise definition which we adopt for the purpose of our study. Their starting point is an 
index of the inter-temporal social welfare of an economy at a given time t. Inter-temporal social 
welfare, denoted by ௧ܸ, is a measure of the present discounted value of social welfare attained at 
each future date along a given development path. An economy is, then, said to be on a 
sustainable development path if and only if ௧ܸ is not decreasing over time along that path. 
Clearly, this definition puts the emphasis on the change in social welfare, not on its level, and on 
the inter-temporal aspect. One consequence of the inter-temporal emphasis is that trade-offs are 
allowed, in the sense that social welfare may be lower at some future date than it is today so long 
as the discounted present value is not declining.8  
 
It is useful to develop a simple theoretical framework to examine more clearly how corruption 
may influence the prospect of sustainable development. The framework builds on Dasgupta and 
Mäler (2000).  They imagine a society populated by many identical individuals who live forever. 
Time (t) is continuous. For simplicity, we assume that the population size is fixed. The economy 
produces an all-purpose good ( ௧ܻ) from labor (ܮ௧), manufactured capital (ܭ௧), and the flow of 
natural resources (ܴ௧). The production technology is represented as: 
     (1)      ௧ܻ ൌ ܨሺܮ௧, ܭ௧, ܴ௧ሻ, 
where F increases in each of the three arguments and is continuously differentiable. It is 
important to stress that the production function need not be concave. As a consequence, our 
results regarding sustainable development and corruption apply to a wide class of economies 
with externalities and other market and government failures. Manufactured capital evolves over 
time according to the following law of motion: 
     (2)      ௗ௄೟
ௗ௧
ൌ ܨሺܮ௧, ܭ௧, ܴ௧ሻ െ ܥ௧ ؠ ܫ௧௄, 
                                                 
8See Arrow et al. (2004, p. 150) for further discussion of the implications of this definition.  
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where ܥ௧ is aggregate consumption, ܫ௧௄ is investment in manufactured capital, and it is assumed 
that there is no depreciation. The natural resource base (ܵ௧) evolves according to the following 
law of motion: 
     (3)      ௗௌ೟
ௗ௧
ൌ ܯሺܵ௧ሻ െ ܴ௧ ؠ ܫ௧ௌ, 
where ܯሺܵ௧ሻ is the natural rate of regeneration of the resource and ܫ௧ௌ can be interpreted as the 
net investment in the resource base. For non-renewable resources, the regeneration rate is zero 
for all ܵ௧, while for renewable resources it is positive. Individuals derive utility from 
consumption and disutility from labor supply. This is represented by a concave utility function, 
ܷሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ. Inter-temporal social welfare at time t can, then, be defined by a utilitarian social 
welfare function: 
     (4)     ௧ܸ ൌ ׬ ܷሺܥఛ, ܮఛሻ
ஶ
௧ ݁
ఋሺఛି௧ሻ݀߬ 
where δ>0 is the (utility) discount factor. A development path ఛܲ starting at time τ is a projection 
into the future of all relevant economic quantities, i.e., ఛܲ ؠ ሼܥఛ, ܮఛ, ܴఛ, ܭఛ, ܵఛሽఛୀ௧ஶ . The 
economy's institutions govern which of the infinitely many potential development paths is 
actually chosen. These include economic institutions, such as markets and trade regimes, legal 
institutions that govern the way disputes are settled, and political institutions that determine how 
the economy is governed, by whom, and regulate how power is contested, etc. Particular 
institutions select particular development paths through the choices made by private individuals 
and public sector officials under those prevailing institutions. There is no presumption that 
institutions are perfect. Economic institutions can be dysfunctional (distorted markets, 
unregulated monopolies, etc.) or not, rent-seeking may be kept in check or not, the society may 
be governed by a democratically elected leader or by a dictator, and corruption may or may not 
be controlled through monitoring or wage incentives. What is important for the arguments that 
follow is that the institutions can be taken as given; they can be affected by reform, but do not 
evolve organically over time.9 Society's institutions are formally defined as a function, α, that, 
given the state of the economy at each time t, ሼܭ௧, ܵ௧ሽ, selects a development path ( ෠ܲ௧) from the 
                                                 
9 This is a strong assumption but one which can be justified by the so-called “critical junctions” theory of 
institutional development. According to this theory, institutional reform happens at critical junctions in history. Once 
the new institutions are in place, they persist for a long time - until the next critical junction. See Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) for an example of this with regard to political institutions and La Porta et al. (1997) with regard to legal 
institutions. This view is, however, challenged by modernization theory, according to which democratic institutions 
gradually emerge as a consequence of economic development (see, e.g., Gundlach and Paldam, 2009b, and 
Guerriero (2010) who shows legal institutions also evolve gradually in response to socio-economic factors). 
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set of all feasible paths. We can then write inter-temporal social welfare explicitly as a function 
of institutions and their stocks of capital: ௧ܸ ൌ ܸሺߙ, ܭ௧, ܵ௧ሻ. 
 
The key question is how, in practice, we can judge whether the development path chosen by a 
society ( ෠ܲ௧) is sustainable or not. By definition, sustainability requires that inter-temporal social 
welfare is not declining over time. Since inter-temporal social welfare is not something that can 
be readily observed, this is, in itself, not very helpful for evaluating development paths 
empirically. Fortunately, Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) prove two important equivalence results 
which provide the fuzzy concept of sustainability with real empirical content.10 We shall focus 
on the most immediate of these as that suffices for our present purpose. The social scarcity of 
two capital assets can be measured by their accounting or shadow prices: 
     (5)     ݌௧ሺߙሻ ؠ
డ௏ሺఈ,௄೟,ௌ೟ሻ
డ௄೟
, 
     (6)     ݍ௧ሺߙሻ ؠ
డ௏ሺఈ,௄೟,ௌ೟ሻ
డௌ೟
. 
The shadow prices measure the change is inter-temporal social welfare associated with a small 
increase in the relevant capital stock. Recall that inter-temporal social welfare is a function of 
institutions and capital stocks, i.e., ௧ܸ ൌ ܸሺߙ, ܭ௧, ܵ௧ሻ. Calculation of the total derivative, keeping 
institutions fixed, gives: 
     (7)     ௗ௏೟
ௗ௧
ൌ డ௏
డ௄೟
ௗ௄೟
ௗ௧
൅ డ௏
డௌ೟
ௗௌ೟
ௗ௧
. 
Using the definitions of the accounting prices from above (equations (5) and (6)), along with 
equations (2) and (3), we can rewrite equation (7) as: 
     (8)     ௗ௏೟
ௗ௧
ൌ ݌௧ሺߙሻܫ௧௄ ൅ ݍ௧ሺߙሻܫ௧
ௌ ؠ ܩܫ, 
where GI is short-hand for genuine investment.11  Genuine investment reflects the change in 
society's genuine wealth (GW), i.e., ܩܫ௧ ؠ
ௗீௐ೟
ௗ௧
. Genuine investment is linked to the change in 
inter-temporal social welfare through equation (8), which provides the fundamental link between 
theory and empirical implementation. This says that the change in inter-temporal social welfare 
at time t in a society governed by institutions α is increasing if, and only if, the net investment in 
its genuine wealth is positive, i.e., if, and only if, genuine investment is positive.  In other words, 
                                                 
10 See also Dasgupta (2001, chapter 9) and Hamilton and Clemens (1999). 
11 The term genuine saving is sometimes used in this context. Empirically, we cannot distinguish the two. In this 
study we follow Arrow et al. (2004) and refer to the change in an economy's genuine wealth as genuine investment. 
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the main determinant of inter-temporal social welfare is an economy's productive base. This base 
consists of all the economy’s capital assets, including manufactured and natural capital, as in the 
model, but, more generally, it also includes human and social capital. The change in the 
productive base can be expressed as the sum of the values of investment or disinvestment in the 
underlying capital assets, where the assets are priced at their social opportunity cost, i.e., at 
shadow prices. From an empirical point of view, there is some hope that genuine investment (GI) 
can be estimated, while inter-temporal social welfare itself is much harder, if not impossible, to 
measure objectively. We return to this below, but first we inquire into the effect of corruption on 
sustainability, as defined by the index of genuine investment. 
 
Corruption has the potential to undermine sustainable development in many ways. The extent to 
which corruption actually does so is determined by an economy's institutions and its existing 
capital assets. This is because they control the opportunities and incentives for politicians and 
bureaucrats to engage in the ‘sale of public assets for private gain’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
Returning to equation (8), sustainable development requires suitable investment in the economy's 
capital assets. A vast empirical literature strongly suggests that corruption is one reason why 
many societies do not make sufficient investments in their productive base. Take, for example, 
education, i.e., investment in the stock of human capital. Since education is associated with 
positive externalities, the social value of these investments exceeds the private return and public 
funding is justified from a social point of view, in particular for primary education. But do the 
funds committed always reach the schools? Expenditure tracking surveys undertaken by the 
World Bank in Africa suggest that the answer is no: corrupt officials manage to diverge the flow 
of funds to other purposes, most likely to private consumption, somewhere along the way from 
the Treasury to the schools. The most extreme example of this is from Uganda in the mid-1990s, 
where about 80 percent of the funds intended for the surveyed schools disappeared (Reinikka and 
Svensson, 2004). On top of that, the macroeconomic evidence presented by Mauro (1998), Tanzi 
(1998) and many others shows how corruption distorts the portfolio of public spending by 
shifting resources away education and towards public consumption. In short, there are good 
reasons to believe that corruption undermines the accumulation of human capital and may thus 
be a cause of unsustainable development. 
 
10 
 
 
 
Another example is investment in manufactured capital. A large theoretical literature highlights 
different reasons why corruption reduces the incentive to invest.12 The basic point is that 
corruption, through the sale of investment licenses or simply through creation of red tape and 
rent-seeking, serves as a tax on investment. The macroeconomic evidence strongly confirms that 
investment does not thrive in a corrupt environment. In fact, the most robust result of Mauro’s 
(1995) seminal study is that perceived corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency are negatively 
related to investment in manufactured capital. This finding has been confirmed and elaborated on 
by many others since then.13  Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), for example, show that corruption tends 
to increase public investment, but that it is associated with low operation and maintenance 
expenditures and with poor quality of infrastructure, i.e., with investments of lower quality. 
Moreover, Wei (2000) demonstrates that corruption acts like a tax on international investments. 
He reports that an increase in the (perceived) corruption level from that of Singapore to that of 
Mexico would have the same negative effect on inward foreign direct investment as raising the 
tax rate on foreign investment by fifty percentage points.14  Along similar lines, Rose-Ackerman 
(1999, chapter 3) argues that corrupt politicians favor investment projects with inefficiently high 
capital-intensity (“white elephants”) because the stream of bribe income generated by such 
projects is front-loaded.  As a consequence of this bias, too little investment is subsequently 
made in maintaining the capital. This effect is magnified by political instability which, in itself, 
reduces the time horizon of politicians.   
 
The final example relates to the management of natural capital.  Leite and Weidmann (2002) and 
many others provide macroeconomic evidence on the close association between extraction of 
natural resources, resource rents, and corruption. Anecdotal evidence linking the exploitation of 
natural resources to corruption is also abundant, ranging from kick-backs associated with logging 
concessions in Malaysia and Indonesia to oil concessions in Nigeria. (Rose-Ackerman (1999, 
chapter 3) provides many more examples). The consequence of these distortions is 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Murphy et al. (1991, 1993), Blackburn et al., (2006, 2008), or Ellis and 
Fender (2006). 
13Most of this evidence relates to perceived corruption. A notable exception is Campos et al. (1999). They use data 
on self-reported experience with bribe giving from the World Bank’s Business Enterprise Survey and demonstrate 
that experienced corruption, both the level and its predictability, is negatively related to investment in manufactured 
capital. 
14Others have, however, found that corruption attracts foreign direct investment (Egger and Winner, 2005; Sena and 
Martianova, 2008).  
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environmental degradation. In fact, this is directly related to a vast literature on the so-called 
resource curse. Economic logic suggests that abundance of natural resources should be beneficial 
for economic development. After all, extraction of natural resources has a direct positive effect 
on GDP and the resource rent can, in principle, be taxed away without distorting economic 
decisions  and invested in various capital assets, allowing a resource-abundant economy to enjoy 
higher levels of consumption than a resource-scarce economy, not just in the short run but also in 
the long term. Yet, as first demonstrated by Sachs and Warner (1995), despite this apparent 
advantage, resource-rich countries tend to grow at a slower rate than other countries.15 One 
often-cited reason for this curse is that resource abundance fosters a ‘rentier’ economy with 
rampant corruption and poorly developed institutions (e.g., Auty, 1993; Lane and Tornell, 1996; 
Robinson et al. 2006; Mehlum et al. 2006; Hodler, 2006). Such an environment not only 
encourages over use of the natural resource base, also crowds out investment in manufactured 
and human capital (Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006), misallocates talent away 
from innovative activities to rent-seeking (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998) and encourages growth-
harming increases in government consumption (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). While natural 
resources used in this way can feed corruption, the adverse effect can, as demonstrated by 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), be mitigated by high quality democratic institutions. Yet, the 
general message from this literature is that resource rents induce corruption where institutions 
are weak, and that corruption and weak institutions encourage over use of natural capital. The 
implied net result is a significant fall in genuine investment. 
  
These examples show that corruption can be a threat to sustainable development through the 
effect it has on investment in an economy’s productive base. However, they also demonstrate 
another basic point. The effect of corruption on economic growth, defined in terms of GDP per 
capita, is likely to be smaller than the corresponding effect of corruption on genuine investment 
and sustainability, at least over the medium term. To demonstrate this, equation (1) is used to 
calculate the rate of change of GDP (keeping labor input fixed for simplicity): 
                                                 
15The most recent evidence on the resource curse (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010), 
which corrects for various endogeneity problems, however, casts some doubt on the simple proposition that resource 
abundance reduces economic growth unconditionally. For example, Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) show that the effect 
works through economic instability and that only where economic instability is sufficiently large is resource 
abundance a curse. 
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     (9)     ௗ௒೟
ௗ௧
ൌ డி
డ௄೟
ܫ௧௄ሺߙሻ ൅
డி
డோ೟
డோ೟
డ௧
ሺߙሻ 
and the result is compared to that from equation (8), reproduced here for convenience: 
     (8’)    ௗ௏೟
ௗ௧
ൌ ݌௧ሺߙሻܫ௧௄ ൅ ݍ௧ሺߙሻܫ௧
ௌ ؠ ܩܫ 
If we suppose that corruption has a negative effect on investment in manufactured capital (for 
one of the reasons discussed above), this would show up both as a reduction in the rate of change 
of GDP and as a reduction in genuine investment. However, if we suppose, instead, that corrupt 
politicians plunder a society's natural resources by selling off mineral, fishing or oil rights for 
private gain, or by allowing developers, in exchange for a bribe, to build on land that should, 
from a social point of view, have been protected because of the eco-services it provides, and that 
the proceeds from these transactions are directed at immediate consumption rather than at 
investment in other capital stocks,16 corruption then induces an immediate increase in the rate of 
change of GDP (డோ೟
డ௧
  in equation (9) increases) while genuine investment falls (ܫ௧ௌ in equation (8) 
falls). This observation goes some way towards explaining why it is hard to find the effect of 
corruption on the growth rate of GDP: conflicting effects may mitigate each other. On the other 
hand, the impact on genuine investment is unambiguously negative.  Again, this line of 
reasoning has a parallel in literature on the resource curse. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) argue 
that negative genuine investment tends to be associated with resource abundance. Along similar 
lines, Neumayer (2004), using cross-national data on GDP adjusted for depreciation of natural 
capital, demonstrates that the impact of resource abundance on adjusted GDP growth is smaller 
than the impact on unadjusted GDP growth. This is consistent with the notion that the effects of 
mismanagement of natural resources fall more directly on genuine investment than on the growth 
rate of GDP. 
 
     
2.2.  How should genuine investment be measured?    
     
In order to study whether corruption is actually associated with, or perhaps even a cause of, 
unsustainable development, as suggested by the analysis above, empirical estimates of genuine 
investment across time and space are needed. Although it is conceptually clear from equation (8) 
                                                 
16 Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) provide a similar argument with an application to the oil boom in Venezuela. 
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what needs to be measured, it is not a straightforward task to do this. One problem is to estimate 
the accounting prices. Another is how to take population and total factor productivity growth 
(factors which were ignored above, but obviously matter in practice) into account. A third 
problem is how to define the relevant capital stocks and then to measure the investment or 
disinvestment in them. A fourth problem is to do all this in a way that makes international 
comparisons possible. 
 
Fortunately, progress has been made in constructing rough empirical proxies for genuine 
investment. The World Bank, as part of the World Development Indicators, publishes an 
estimate of genuine investment on a yearly basis for a large number of countries, based on the 
work by Hamilton and Clemens (1999), Hamilton (2005) and others.17 Table 1 presents the 
figures for genuine investment from a selection of six countries and illustrates how they are 
calculated.  
 
[Table 1: Genuine Investment in Selected Countries, average figures for 1996-2007] 
 
Genuine investment is estimated from gross national savings by making four adjustments that 
reflect investment or disinvestment in the economy's productive base.18 The first adjustment is to 
deduct an estimate of consumption of fixed capital to account for depreciation of manufactured 
capital. This represents the replacement value of capital consumed by the process of production. 
The second adjustment is to add an estimate of investment in human capital. Public expenditure 
on education is used as a proxy for this.19 The third adjustment relates to the social cost of 
environmental pollution and has two parts. The first is designed to capture the cost of global 
warming. An estimate of the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions is subtracted from national 
savings, with the assumption that the average social cost of a tonne of carbon is US$30.  The 
second part is designed to capture the impact of local environmental degradation. The World 
Bank makes a deduction for and makes a financial deduction for an estimate of the health 
                                                 
17See World Development Indicators (various years, Table 3.15). The World Development Indicators uses the term 
“adjusted net saving” or “genuine saving” to describe what we refer to as “genuine investment”. 
18 For details of how to estimate these deductions, see Bolt et al. (2002), or Arrow et al. (2004). 
19 This includes current operating expenditures on wages and salaries but excludes capital investment in buildings 
and equipment. 
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damages due to urban air pollution (particulate emissions) from gross savings. The fourth 
adjustment is also environmentally motivated. It is used to account for energy depletion, mineral 
depletion, and net forest depletion by subtracting an estimate of the relevant resource rents from 
net national savings. These rents are calculated as the market price of the resource minus average 
extraction cost for the two non-renewable resources (energy and mineral depletion). For 
renewable forest resources, the rent is estimated as the market price per unit of harvest in excess 
of the natural regeneration rate.  
 
The result of these adjustments on gross national savings provides a rough estimate of genuine 
investment in terms of the percentage of gross national income (GNI). The figures are reported in 
column 9 of Table 1. We apply the method suggested by Arrow et al. (2003) to convert this into 
an estimate of growth in genuine wealth per capita. It starts by converting the estimate of average 
genuine investment on percentage of GNI into a growth rate of genuine wealth by multiplying by 
a presumed GNI-wealth ratio (υ).20 Arrow et al. (2004) use a ratio of 0.2 for industrialized 
countries and a ratio of 0.15 for developing and oil-rich countries. Next, the population growth 
rate (n) is subtracted from this. In short, our empirical measure of sustainability is: 
     (10)     
೏೒ೢ
೏೟
೒ೢ
ൌ ீூ
ீேூ
υ െ n, 
where gw represents genuine wealth per capita.  The net result for the six countries is reported in 
column 10 of Table 1. Column 11 records the annual growth rates of GDP per capita for 
comparison. All six countries experience positive GDP growth during the period from 1970 to 
2000. However, the estimates of growth in genuine wealth per capita suggest a bleaker picture: 
the current development paths of Brazil, Kenya and Nigeria are unsustainable in the sense that 
they, on average, experienced negative growth in genuine wealth per capita over the period. 
 
How reliable are these data? Clearly, they must be considered very rough indicators of 
sustainability as defined by equation (8). For example, market prices are used to value 
investment in human capital, but we know that this does not reflect the social value of such 
investment. The calculations of the resource rent associated with the various non-renewable and 
                                                 
20 See Hamilton (2005) for an alternative way of making this adjustment. Aidt (2009) shows that it makes little 
difference which of the two methods are used for the statistical analysis of the link between corruption and 
sustainable development. In the interest of brevity, we focus on the one advocated by Arrow et al. (2004). 
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renewable resources are based on average costs, not on marginal costs as they should be. 
Moreover, they use uniform world market prices thereby ignoring between-country quality 
differences in, say, minerals or wood. In addition, clearly not all capital assets have been 
counted. Most importantly, estimates of depletion of fish stocks, erosion of topsoil or depletion 
of water reserves are not included. Total factor productivity is also ignored.21 The calculations 
are also sensitive to the choice of wealth to GNI ratios. The social cost of carbon emissions 
seems on the low side and, in any case, represents an average value rather than social marginal 
cost. It is clear, therefore, that there is ample room for improvement and that these data are noisy. 
However, the trade-off between getting the details right for a few cases and getting a rough 
proxy for many cases is important. The trade-off comes down in favor of the later for answering 
many interesting research questions, including the ones at hand here. In conclusion, for the 
purpose of our statistical analysis, we take these data at face value as the best available proxy for 
sustainable development. In Section 8, we discuss some concrete improvements that could be 
introduced in future research. 
3.    Corruption 
 
Corruption is also an elusive object to quantify and a perfect index or ranking does not exist for 
the purpose of cross-national comparisons. The approach followed here is to emphasize 
robustness and make use of six different cross-national corruption indicators.22 These indicators 
fall into two groups. The first group contains cross-country indices of corruption perceptions. 
These are based on surveys of business consultants, local and international businessmen, or of 
ordinary citizens. The two most commonly used indices of this type are the Corruption 
Perception Index, published by Transparency International (the TI index),23 and the Control of 
Corruption Index, published by the World Bank (the WB index).24,25 The original TI-index 
                                                 
21 Conceptually, one could adjust for this if information on country-specific estimates of total factor productivity 
growth were available (Arrow et al., 2004). Without such data, however, we decided not to make any adjustments, 
rather than applying a one-size-fits-all adjustment based on a guesstimate.  
22 At the national level several “objective” measures of corruption are available. These include data on the number 
of officials convicted for corruption (see e.g., Alt and Lassen (2003) in a study of US states, and Del Monte and 
Papagni (2001) in a study of Itaian regions) and data concerning the amount of leakage from infrastructure projects 
in Italian regions (Golden and Picci, 2005). 
23 http://www.transparency.org/ 
24 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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measures corruption on a scale from 0 to 10. We have re-scaled the index such that 10 represents 
maximum perceived corruption. Likewise, we have normalized the WB index to be between 0 
and 1, with 1 representing the country with the least control of corruption. We also make use of 
the country ranking published yearly in the International Country Risk Guide.26 This rating, 
which we refer to as the ICRG index, is based on evaluations made by a panel of experts, rather 
than on the aggregation of survey data from many different sources. The original ICRG index 
record these evaluations on a scale from 1 to 5. We have inverted  the index so that 1 
corresponds to low corruption and a value of 5 corresponds to high corruption. Data for the three 
indices are available from at least the 1990s. It is, however, debatable as to whether the 
variations in the data over time are informative or not. The problem with respect to the TI and the 
WB index is that the underlying data sources are not the same from year to year, and this can 
account for as much as half the over-time variation (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002, pp. 13-14). The 
ICRG index avoids this problem since it is based on one yearly survey of a panel of experts, but 
has its own problems. As pointed out by Lambsdorff (2005), the index is actually designed to 
measure the risk of political instability caused by corruption rather than corruption itself, and this 
seems to generate unexpected movements over time in the index for some countries. 
Nevertheless, we shall, with this caveat in mind, attempt to use the changes over time in the 
ICRG index in our estimations. 
 
The TI, the WB and the ICRG index all measure perceptions concerning the level of corruption in 
different countries. This is problematic insofar as there is a gap between perceptions and facts on 
the ground. Treisman (2007) provides an illuminating discussion of this point. Equally 
troublesome for the purpose of estimating the impact of corruption on sustainable development, 
these perceptions may be informed partly by the economic conditions prevailing in the country at 
the time the perception were formed. As an alternative to the three corruption perception indices, 
we can draw upon surveys of self-reported experiences with corruption. The World Bank's 
World Business Environment Survey (the WBES)27 interviewed managers in 80 countries in 
1999 and 2000, and asked them to respond to the following statement: “It is common for firms in 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 The two indices differ in the underlying source material used to construct the ratings; in the method used to 
aggregate the information, and in the time and country coverage, but are highly correlated. 
26Unlike the other indexes, this index is not available for free. 
27 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/ 
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my line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional’ payment to get things done”. We 
have coded the WBES index based on the country averages, such that 1 corresponds to everyone 
answering “never” and 6 corresponds to everyone responding with “always”. Transparency 
International conducted a similar survey – the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) – in 2004 
and 2005. This survey recorded the percentage of citizens in different countries who answered 
“Yes” to the question: “In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid 
a bribe in any form?” We refer to this as the GCB index. Finally, the Inter-regional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI),28 under the United Nations, conducted a survey in the late 
1990s that recorded the percentage of respondents who had been asked to pay a bribe by 
government officials during previous year. We refer to this as the UNICRI index. The merit of 
these three indices is that they are each targeted at eliciting information from first-hand 
experience with corruption. Yet, like the perception-based indices, they have their weaknesses. 
First, selective non-despondence is likely to be a problem as respondents may have incentives to 
understate their experience with corruption.  Second, it is also problematic that individuals are 
likely to adjust their behavior to past experiences with corruption. For example, they may stop 
engaging with certain public officials to avoid paying bribes. If so, when asked about bribe 
payments they might have made in the immediate past they truthfully report that they have made 
none, but only because they have stopped interacting with those officials who demand bribes. 
Both of these effects suggest that self-reported experience with corruption may under-estimate 
the true extent of bribery, and that the under-estimate may be systematically larger in countries 
with high levels of corruption. The fact that country coverage for respondents is much more 
sparse than for perceptions based indexes is also an issue for the present study.  
 
Nonetheless, by making use of all six proxies for corruption, we hope to gauge the robustness of 
our statistical findings. Another good reason for focusing both on perception-based and 
experience-based indices of corruption is that they are likely to capture different aspects of 
corruption. The experience-based indices of corruption are clearly directed at measuring petty 
corruption. The perception-based indices may, in addition, pick up information concerning 
                                                 
28 http://www.unicri.it/ 
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“grand corruption” and “government capture”.29 So, by studying both, we might be able to say 
something about the impact of different types of corruption on sustainability. 
 
4. A first look at the data 
 
Perhaps the most instructive way to eyeball the data is to split the sample of 110 countries into 
four groups. To do this, we, one the one hand, divide the countries into those with positive and 
negative, respectively, growth in genuine wealth per capita over the period from 1996 to 2007, 
and, on the other hand, we divide them into those with high and those with low corruption levels 
according to either the WB or the WBES index.30 
 
[Table 2a:  Cross-tabulation of growth in genuine wealth per capita and perceived corruption 
(the WB index)] 
[Table 2b:  Cross-tabulation of growth in genuine wealth per capita and actual corruption (the 
WBES index)] 
 
The resulting two-way tabulations are shown in Tables 2a and 2b. The tables report the names of 
the countries that fall into each of the four cells. Table 2a shows the cross tabulation for the WB 
index and Table 2b shows the tabulation for the WBES index. The majority of countries fall on 
the left-right diagonal, i.e., either follow a sustainable path with low corruption or an 
unsustainable path with high corruption, but a sizeable minority manage to stay on a sustainable 
path, despite having high corruption. However, it is relatively rare that a country follows an 
unsustainable path while experiencing low corruption levels. All in all, these illustrations are 
suggestive of a negative correlation between sustainable development and corruption, but before 
we can draw firm conclusions, we need to subject the data to more thorough investigation. 
 
                                                 
29 Rose-Ackerman (1999, chapters 3 and 5) discuses the distinction between petty and grand corruption in detail. 
30 We use the median level of corruption to classify countries as being high or low corruption. 
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5. Econometric specification 
 
The theory, sketched in Section 2.1, suggests that growth in genuine wealth per capita is 
determined by three broad factors: the institutions that govern resource allocation (α), the 
productive base of the economy (the capital stocks), and the shadow prices of these resources 
along the chosen path. We will use this as a guide to formulate our econometric model. 
However, in doing so, we must be careful not to explain growth in genuine wealth per capita 
with variables, such as the value of resource rents, government expenditure on education etc., 
that are themselves part of the empirical definition of genuine investment. For the purpose of the 
statistical analysis, we have divided the sample of up to 110 countries into three cross-sections, 
covering the years 1996-1999, 2000-2003, and 2004-2007, respectively.  The dependent variable 
is growth in genuine wealth per capita and our baseline specification is the following panel 
model:31  
 
(11)  ݈݀݊݃ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ܥܱܴܴܷܲܶܫܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௞ܫܰܵܶܫܷܶܶܫܱܰ ௜ܵ௧௞ ൅௞
ത
௞ୀଵ ∑ ߚଵ௟ܱܵܶܥܭ ௜ܵ௧
௟ ൅௟ҧ௟ୀଵ  
     ∑ ߚଵ௟ܵܪܣܦܱ ௜ܹ௧௟ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ҧ௦ୀଵ  , 
where i is a country index and t=1,2,3 represent the three cross-sections. The error term has three 
sub-components: ߤ௜ represents unobserved country-specific determinants of sustainability that do 
not vary over time; ߛ௧ represents common time-specific shocks to sustainability, and ߝ௜௧ 
represents all unobserved determinants of sustainability that vary over time within a country. The 
variable CORRUPTION corresponds to one of the six corruption indices discussed above, while 
the variables INSTITUTIONS, STOCKS and SHADOW represent the three major categories of 
control variables suggested by theory, namely the proxies for political and legal institutions, for 
the capital stocks, and for the accounting or shadow prices (as discussed below). 
  
Only one of the six corruption indices (the ICRG index) has potentially meaningful over-time 
variation. So, for the bulk of the estimations, the variation used to estimate β0 comes from the 
cross-section only. The theory refers to institutions, broadly defined. Corruption is clearly part of 
                                                 
31 We prefer to use growth in genuine wealth per capita directly rather than a dichotomous classification into 
sustainable (positive growth) and unsustainable economies (negative growth), along the lines of Table 2. This is 
because sustainability is measured with a great deal of error and such a classification would inevitably allocate 
countries to the wrong category.  
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this, but the underlying political and legal institutions clearly play a pivotal role. Conceptually, 
these may be of influence in their own right, i.e., irrespective of the level of corruption. One 
possibility is that the variations in political accountability systematically affect the time horizon 
of politicians and thus their incentive to invest in the economy’s capital assets (Aidt and Dutta, 
2007). Another is that some legal environments make it hard to enforce inter-temporal contracts. 
However, it is also clear that that political and legal institutions are amongst the key determinants 
of corruption (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000) and that they may affect the extent to which 
corruption adversely affects economic outcomes.32  As a matter of fact, in our sample, the 
correlation between the various corruption indices and the other governance indicators in the 
World Bank's Governance Matters Database33 is higher than -0.75, with the exception of the 
index of the rule of law (-0.15). In the baseline specifications, we include one proxy for the legal 
framework and one for the quality of political institutions. Our choice of proxy is guided by the 
desire to avoid too much multicollinearity. We use a dummy variable as a proxy for legal 
institutions (common law), to show whether the legal code of the country falls under common 
law or not (La Porta et al., 1997). The correlation between this variable and corruption is 
relatively low (less than -0.15). The variable is meant to capture systematic differences in the 
contracting environment, rather than variations in the rule of law as such. We use two alternative 
measures as a proxy for the quality of political institutions. The first is the Freedom House Index 
of Political Freedom (political freedom).34 Freedom House rates countries according to the 
degree of political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of the government, based on 
the judgment of a panel of experts. We have adjusted the index such that higher values on the 
scale from 1 to 7 reflect institutions that function better. Since one of the categories used to 
construct this index refers to whether the government is free from pervasive corruption, it is 
directly related to corruption, yet its correlation with the corruption indices is lower than for the 
governance indictors from the Governance Matters Database. Moreover, the index has variation 
over time, which we shall explore in the estimations. The other indicator of the quality of 
political institutions is a measure of their experience with democracy (democracy), suggested by 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Aidt et al. (2008) or Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010). 
33 See Kaufmann et al., (2005, 2006) or www.govindicators.org. The indicators are the index of Voice and 
Accountability, the index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; the index of Government 
Effectiveness, and the index of Regulatory Quality. 
34 http://www.freedomhouse.org 
21 
 
 
 
Treisman (2007). We record whether or not a country is a democracy as of the year in question 
(1996, 2000 or 2004) based on the classification of Beck et al. (2001). If it was a democracy at 
the relevant junction35, the variable democracy then records the number of consecutive years 
since 1930 that the political system was democratic. In other words, we attempt to measure how 
consolidated a democracy is in each country. If the country is not democratic at the relevant 
junction, democracy takes on the value of 0. The variable democracy includes time, as well as 
cross-national variation, and its correlation with the corruption indices is relatively high (around 
-0.67). It is important to stress that, by conditioning on these proxies for institutional quality, our 
estimate of the impact of corruption on sustainability (ߚ଴ in equation (11)) captures the effect of 
corruption over and above that which can be explained by the checks on corruption induced by 
the institutional framework. In other words, if ߚ଴ is estimated to be zero, it does not necessarily 
mean that corruption is irrelevant for sustainability; it may still exercise an influence through 
dysfunctional institutions. We shall return to this point in Section 6.4. 
 
It is difficult to control for stocks of the various capital assets. The best we can do is to employ 
three imperfect proxies. One is the average years of schooling for the population aged 15 and 
over, lagged by 5 five years (human capital).36 This is only available for 69 of the 110 countries 
in the sample, but is the best available proxy for cross-national differences in the stock of human 
capital. The other proxy is PPP adjusted real GDP per capita (from the World Economic 
Indicators) suitably lagged (GDP per capita). This proxies for the stock of manufactured and 
human capital, but also picks up the flow of natural resources used in the production process, and 
so is, by construction, correlated with genuine investment. It is, therefore, a questionable proxy, a 
fact that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.37 The third proxy is for social 
capital. Bjørnskov (2007), among others, reports a strong negative correlation between survey 
measures of social capital and income inequality. This suggests that we can use the Gini 
coefficient38 to proxy for social capital (inequality). A higher Gini coefficient corresponds to 
larger income inequality, and thus to a smaller stock of social capital. We have considered 
various proxies for the stock of natural capital, such as fuel export relative to total manufacturing 
                                                 
35 Democracies are those with a score of 6 or higher on Beck et al.'s (2001) measure of executive constraints. 
36 The source for this is Barro and Lee (2001). 
37 The main results are not affected if we exclude GDP per capita from the estimations. 
38 The source for this is UNDP (2004). 
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exports, or the World Bank’s (2006) estimate of the stock of natural capital. The two main 
problems with these measures are that they relate directly to the extraction of natural resources 
(fuel exports), rather than to the stock, and that they are constructed from the same data on 
resources rents that are used to estimate genuine investment. For this reason, we do not include 
any of these measures in the baseline specifications, but consider them as part of the robustness 
analysis in Section 7. 
 
It is even more difficult to find proxies for the relevant accounting or shadow prices. The best we 
can do here is to note that world market prices can, in some cases, serve as shadow prices. The 
extent to which this is relevant depends on a country’s involvement in international trade. This 
can, in turn, be measured by the variable trade openness which records spending on imports of 
goods and services as a percentage of GDP (and is sourced from World Economic Indicators). It 
is clear, however, that this is more related to whether local prices are linked to world market 
prices than to any specific values of the relevant shadow prices, and thus not a very accurate 
proxy. Appendix Table A1 reports summary statistics for all the variables used in the statistical 
analysis. 
6. Estimation results 
 
The major statistical challenge is to obtain a robust and unbiased estimate of β0, the effect of 
corruption on growth in genuine wealth per capita.  We rise to that challenge by estimating 
equation (11) in three different ways. First, we use a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator with panel-corrected standard errors; second, we use the Hausman-Taylor random 
effects estimator; and, third, we use an instrumental variables (IV) estimator. We discuss the 
merits of these techniques and the results they yield in the following sub-sections. 
 
6.1       Pooled OLS estimates 
Our first estimation approach pools the three cross-sections and estimates the model with 
ordinary least squares (OLS). We allow for panel heteroskedasticity and for spatial correlations 
between the error terms across countries, and the reported standard errors of the parameter 
23 
 
 
 
estimates are panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs), as recommended by Beck and Katz 
(1995). 
 
[Table 3: Growth in Genuine Wealth per capita and Perceived Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Democracy.] 
 
[Table 4: Growth in Genuine Wealth per capita and Perceived Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Political Freedom.] 
 
[Table 5: Growth in Genuine Wealth per capita and Experienced Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Democracy.] 
 
[Table 6: Growth in Genuine Wealth per capita and Experienced Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Political Freedom.] 
 
The results are presented in four tables. Tables 3 and 4 show estimations based on the three 
indices of perceived corruption, but differ with regard to how we control for political institutions 
(the specifications in Table 3 control for democracy while those in Table 4 control for political 
freedom). Tables 5 and 6 show a similar set of estimations, but these are based on the three 
indices of experienced corruption. All specifications control for common law and include a full 
set of regional dummy variables, and time-fixed effects [not reported in the Tables]. Moreover, 
for each combination of corruption index and institutional control variable, we show two 
specifications; one with the four control variables – inequality, gdp per capita, human capital, 
and trade openness – and one without. The main reasons for reporting both specifications are, 
firstly, that 30 observations are lost when we add the four additional control variables39 and, 
secondly, that one can question the appropriateness of these control variables. 
 
Taken together, the estimations reported in the four tables demonstrate that, conditional on the 
quality and type of political and legal institutions, corruption, however it is measured, is 
significantly negatively correlated with growth in genuine wealth per capita. This correlation is 
                                                 
39 The bottleneck is human capital. 
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robust across many different specifications, with and without the extra control variables. The 
negative effect is particularly pronounced in the specifications based on individuals' self-reported 
experience with corruption (Tables 5 and 6). It is somewhat less robust in the specifications with 
perceived corruption. In particular, corruption is insignificant in the specifications based on the 
ICRG index (see columns (5) and (6) of Tables 3 and 4).40 This suggests that petty corruption is 
at least as important as grand corruption. 
 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the effect, we may consider the point estimate for the TI index 
reported in column (1) of Table 3 (-0.30). Take a country, Denmark, with one of the lowest 
average TI index scores over the period (0.40) and imagine that corruption in Denmark suddenly 
increased to the level perceived to prevail in a country with one of the highest average TI index 
scores, Nigeria (8.5). Then growth in genuine wealth per capita would fall from a healthy 2.37 
percent to -0.06. In other words, the sharp increase in corruption would make the development 
path of Denmark unsustainable! Alternatively, let us consider the point estimate on the GCB 
index reported in column (3) of Table 6 (-0.034). In the OECD economies covered by the survey, 
less than one percent of the respondents claim that they were asked for a bribe during the past 
year. In the country with the highest score (Cameroon), 52 percent of respondents reported that 
they had paid a bribe. So, a country that went from the “OECD level” of one percent to the 
“African level” of 50 percent would, ceteris paribus, see its growth rate of genuine wealth per 
capita reduced by 1.73 percentage points. Of course, these examples are extreme in that they 
consider unrealistically big jumps in corruption. Yet, they serve the purpose of illustrating that 
the effect of corruption on growth in genuine wealth per capita is of economic, as well as 
statistical, significance.  
 
While corruption is robustly related to sustainability, it is harder to detect a consistent pattern 
with respect to political and legal institutions. The two measures of political institutions, 
democracy and political freedom, are mostly insignificant, but occasionally, we find a positive 
and significant effect, suggesting that established democratic institutions and political freedom 
                                                 
40 It is not the fact that we explore the variation over time in the ICRG index that is behind this. Similar results 
emerge if we time-average the index [not reported here]. 
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may contribute to sustainable development (over and above the effect they may have on 
corruption). Our measure of legal institutions, common law, is significant in about half the 
specifications. The point estimate is negative. This suggests that countries with a common law 
system perform worse than countries with a civil law (or some other legal) system. Common law 
systems tend to promote financial development because they offer better protection of investors 
(La Porta et al. 1998). Combined with our finding, this suggests that financial development and 
sustainable development may not go hand in hand. 
 
The economic control variables matter in some, but far from all, specifications. First, gdp per 
capita has a negative effect on sustainability, as one would expect if it proxies for the stocks of 
manufactured and human capital. Second, inequality has a negative effect, as one would expect if 
equality is associated with more social capital and trust. Third, human capital and trade openness 
both have positive effects on growth in genuine wealth per capita. The latter effect is what one 
would expect if international trade brings domestic market prices closer to their accounting 
prices; the former effect is more puzzling and suggests that the number of years of schooling 
relates to something other than the stock of human capital (perhaps, social capital).41 
 
6.2.   Hausman-Taylor estimates 
 
For a variety of reasons, the estimates presented in Tables 3 to 6 are unlikely to represent a 
causal effect. One major issue is that the six corruption indices are correlated with unobserved 
country-specific factors, such as culture, history and, insofar as they are not controlled for by 
related to our proxies for political and legal institutions, institutional factors. In other words, it is 
possible that ܥ݋ݒሺܥܱܴܴܷܲܶܫܱ ௜ܰ, ߤ௜ሻ ് 0. In principle, we could address this issue with a fixed 
effects estimator. The problem, however, is that five of the six corruption indices have little 
meaningful variation over time, and the variation that does occur over time in one– the ICRG 
index –is not strong enough to accommodate a fixed effects estimator. The standard random 
effects estimator is not appropriate either because corruption, as measured by the six indices, is 
almost surely correlated with the unobserved country-specific factors. The only way forward, 
                                                 
41 The most immediate explanation for this result, however, is that there is persistence in school expenditures, so that 
the expenditures in the past are correlated with expenditures in the present and, therefore, with current education 
attainment levels. 
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then, is to employ the Hausman-Taylor estimator.42 This estimator is designed to address the 
problem that corruption is endogenous in the sense of being correlated with unobserved country-
specific factors, and has the advantage that we do not have to find external instruments. More 
specifically, the estimator is based on the assumption that while the relevant corruption index 
and the relevant measure of political institutions may be correlated with unobserved country-
specific effects, none of other independent variables are so correlated. In addition, we must 
assume that all the independent variables are uncorrelated with the time-varying country-specific 
error term (ߝ௜௧). Given these assumptions, we can use the time-averaged values of the exogenous 
time-varying variables as instruments for (a random effects transformation of) the corruption 
index and the deviation from the time-average of the endogenous time-varying variable as an 
instrument for (a random effects transformation of) the measure of political institutions 
(Wooldridge, 2002). We can test the appropriateness of these instruments using a Hausman over-
identification test. This test evaluates the Hausman-Taylor model against its fixed effects 
counterpart (where the effects of all the time-invariant variables are subsumed in the fixed 
effect). If the test statistic is insignificant, then the Hausman-Taylor estimator is consistent and 
more efficient than its fixed effects counterpart. 
 
[Table 7: Growth in Genuine Wealth per capita and Corruption, 1996-2007: The Hausman-
Taylor Estimator specification with Democracy. ] 
 
[Table 8: Growth in Genuine Wealth per capita and Corruption, 1996-2007: The Hausman-
Taylor Estimator specification with Political Freedom.] 
 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. We exclude human capital from all the 
specifications shown in order to maximize sample size, but note that so doing makes little 
difference to the results. The Hausman over-identification test reported at the bottom of the 
Tables 7 and 8 supports, in each case, the choice of the Hausman-Taylor model. The picture 
remains clear with regard to the effect of corruption on growth in genuine wealth per capita: 
irrespective of the corruption index used, and irrespective of how we control for political 
institutions, corruption has a significant negative effect on sustainability. The magnitude of the 
                                                 
42 See Hauseman and Taylor (1981). 
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effect is larger than that reported previously43, suggesting that once we take unobserved country-
specific factors such as culture, geography, history, etc. into account, the effect of corruption is 
even more substantial than when we do not do so. On the other hand, it is clear from Tables 7 
and 8 that the direct effect of political institutions is largely eliminated by the fixed effects, while 
common law occasionally has a significant negative effect on sustainability. 
 
6.3. Instrumental variables estimates 
 
The Hausman-Taylor estimator deals with one type of endogeneity, namely that related to 
unobserved country-specific determinants of sustainability, but not with others. In particular, the 
approach assumes that the corruption indices (and the other explanatory variables) are 
uncorrelated with all unobserved country-specific time-varying determinants of sustainability. 
This would not be the case if growth in genuine wealth affects corruption (reverse causality), if 
corruption is measured with error, or if our control variables do not pick up all aspects of the 
institutional and economic environment that might affect both corruption and sustainability 
(omitted variables). 
 
These are real issues, and to address them, we need to find external instruments for corruption, 
i.e., we need to find variables that are correlated with corruption, but uncorrelated with all 
unobserved determinants of growth in genuine wealth. In other words, we need to find variables 
that affect sustainability only through their effect on corruption. This is a tall order. The best we 
can do is to follow the literature and pick instrumental variables that have proved useful in 
previous research on the economic consequence of corruption.  Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. 
(1998), Hall and Jones (1999), and Gupta et al. (2002), amongst others, have suggested that 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ethnicity)44, past corruption levels (the initial ICRG index), and 
distance from the equator (latitude) can all be used as instruments for corruption in GDP growth 
or income inequality regressions. It is not difficult to find objections to these instruments. While 
                                                 
43 Strictly speaking, we cannot directly compare these estimates to those reported in Tables 3 to 6 since these 
specifications include human capital. However, whether or not this variable is included makes little difference to the 
size of the point estimates [not reported], so no large error is introduced  by making the comparison. 
 
44 See Taylor and Hudson (1972). 
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the presence of many different ethnic groups may foster corruption because public officials favor 
their own group at the expense of others, or because this leads to less coordinated bribe-taking, it 
is quite possible that the degree of fractionalization is directly related to sustainable 
development. For example, Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is related to economic growth and, as we discuss in more detail below, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization is, in fact, strongly correlated with growth in genuine wealth per 
capita. Lagged values are relevant instruments, but are only valid if there is no series correlation 
left in the error term of the outcome regression. Although Hall and Jones (1999) proposed a 
measure of distance from equator as an instrument for social infrastructure – a composite index 
that includes, as one component, corruption – it is really an instrument for institutions, defined 
broadly, rather than for a specific aspect of governance, such as corruption. Moreover, Acemoglu 
(2005) questions the underlying rationale for focusing on the distance from equator, namely that 
“good” institutions spread from Europe to geographically similar regions.  
 
With these significant caveats in mind, Table 9 reports some instrumental variables estimations 
based on these three instruments. We have time-averaged the dependent variable growth in 
genuine wealth per capita and effectively treat the data as one cross section. We only report 
specifications where we use democracy to control for political institutions and where we do not 
include any of the economic control variables.45 Statistically speaking, the three instruments 
work reasonably well for the TI and WB index. They are jointly significant in the first stage of 
the two stage estimation procedure and the p-value on the Hansen J test for over-identification is 
large. For the ICRG index and the WBES index, however, the instruments fail the standard 
specification tests. Focusing, then, on the estimations for the TI index and the WB index, we see 
that the point estimates are somewhat larger in absolute value than the corresponding OLS 
estimates, reported at the bottom of the table, and are also statistically significant. This suggests 
that the OLS estimates might be biased towards zero. Such a bias is consistent both with 
measurement error and reverse causality. 
 
[Table 9: Instrumental Variables Estimates (2SLS); Endogenous variable: Corruption.] 
                                                 
45 The results when political freedom is used instead of democracy are very similar. The IV estimates of ߚ଴ are not 
significant when the full set of economic control variables are included. 
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6.4. Hierarchies of institutions 
 
Our estimation strategy so far has been predicated on the assumption that political and legal 
institutions affect sustainability directly and that the effect of corruption can be estimated 
conditionally on the institutional context. However, it may be more instructive to think in terms 
of a hierarchy of institutions. At the top of the hierarchy, we find political and legal institutions. 
These determine the equilibrium level of corruption. This, then, determines economic outcomes 
(here, sustainability). Another way to state the same point is to note that “corruption is a 
symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the state. Institutions designed to 
govern the interrelationships between the citizens and the state are used instead for personal 
enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt.” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, page 9, italics 
added). Persson (2004) and Eicher and Leukert (2009) also advocate this line of reasoning as a 
guide to empirical research. Within our present context, the logic of a hierarchy of institutions 
implies that we should use our measures of political and legal institutions as instruments for 
corruption. That is, we should, first, estimate the impact of institutions on corruption, and, then, 
estimate the impact of corruption on sustainability.  
 
Table 10 presents the results from a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure based 
on this logic, in which we use democracy and common law as additional instruments for 
corruption (we also continue to use the three instruments introduced above). The estimates 
obtained in this way are highly statistically significant and suggest that corruption has a large 
negative effect on growth in genuine wealth per capita. Equally importantly, the new 
instruments perform well statistically: they can explain corruption in the first stage (i.e. they are 
‘relevant’ instruments) and they have no difficulty passing the Hansen J test. Of course, this test 
can only tell us whether the new instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the unobserved 
component of sustainability) conditional on at least one of the other instruments being valid 
(which may not be the case). Yet, the results are encouraging for the “hierarchies of institutions” 
hypothesis. In particular, these results leave the door open for the interpretation that institutions 
may mainly exercise an influence on sustainable development because they control the extent of 
corruption. 
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[Table 10: Instrumental Variables Estimates (2SLS); The “Hierarchies of Institutions” 
Hypothesis.] 
7. Robustness analysis 
 
We have undertaken a larger number of robustness checks. First, visional inspection of the data 
makes it clear that outliers could be an issue. In particular, Angola and Democratic Republic of 
Congo stand out from the rest in that they experienced extremely high negative growth in 
genuine wealth during the late 1990s and early 2000s. We have re-estimated the various 
statistical models without those two countries and there is little difference to the results. We have 
also re-estimated the models presented in Tables 3 to 6 using an outlier robust estimator (the 
least-absolute-value estimator). This makes a difference in some specifications but, for the vast 
majority of specifications, we conclude that the correlations reported above are not driven by 
outliers. Second, we have included a number of additional control variables. Firstly, sustainable 
development might be hindered by war and civil conflict. To control for this, we include a 
measure of the number of armed conflicts (external and internal) in which the government of 
each country was involved during the period 1995-2000 (conflict).46  We also use the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index as a proxy for internal conflict (ethnicity). The variable conflict 
is mostly insignificant, and adding it to the various statistical models does not affect the 
conclusions regarding corruption. On the other hand, the variable ethnicity has a negative and 
significant effect on growth in genuine wealth per capita across the board, but, again, adding it 
to the statistical model does not affect the conclusions regarding corruption. This, however, casts 
doubt on the validity of ethnicity as an instrument for corruption. As a consequence, we re-
estimated the instrumental variables’ regressions shown in Tables 9 and 10 without ethnicity. 
The results are very similar to those reported in the two tables. Third, in the main specifications, 
we did not control for the stock of natural capital. We could provide proxies for this by two 
different means, as discussed in Section 5: either by including a measure of the export value of 
mineral fuels as a percentage of manufacturing exports (sourced from the World Development 
                                                 
46 These data can be obtained from the Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University at 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/. 
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Indicators), or by the World Bank’s (2006) proxy for resource wealth. Both of these are, as 
noted, problematic because they are directly related to the calculation of genuine investment, 
however, we have tried to include them in the statistical model. As expected, both of these 
variables correlate negatively with growth in genuine wealth per capita, but adding them to the 
model does not affect the conclusions related to corruption.47  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The analysis presented in this Chapter suggests that corruption is one of the major obstacles to 
sustainable development. We consistently find that cross-national measures of corruption 
perceptions, as well as measures of direct experience with corruption are negatively correlated 
with growth in genuine wealth per capita and that this correlation is robust and to controlling for 
the quality and type of institutions, the stock of human capital, openness to trade, initial GDP per 
capita, inequality and many other observable determinants of sustainability. It is also robust to 
controlling for unobserved country-specific effects. Finally, our instrumental variables’ estimates 
all point in the same direction, and suggest that a causal effect may be at play and that political 
and legal institutions exercise their influence on sustainability through corruption. However, 
even if the thorny issue of causality has not been fully settled – and we acknowledge that it is 
unlikely to be resolved – the robustness of the correlation is itself remarkable, not least when our 
results are contrasted with those that emerge from empirical studies of the effect of corruption on 
economic growth.  
 
The data on genuine investment used in the analysis are, as pointed out above, problematic in 
many regards and there is great scope for improvement. For example, instead of using public 
expenditure on education to approximate investment in human capital, it would be better to use 
information on the social return to education from country-specific surveys. Combined with data 
on educational attainment from, say, the Barro-Lee dataset (Barro and Lee, 2001), one could 
obtain a much better estimate for the social value of investment in the stock of human capital. It 
                                                 
47 Norman (2009) provides an estimate of the reserves of fuel and 35 non-fuel commodities in US$ per capita in 
1970. This must be considered as an exogenous determinant of growth in genuine wealth during the period 1996 to 
2007, and so could be use to control for initial resource stocks in future work. 
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would also be desirable to collect country-specific information on total factor productivity 
growth and use that to adjust the data on growth in genuine wealth. Better estimates on the 
environmental cost of carbon emission could also be obtained. Finally, the World Bank’s 
estimate of genuine investment does not make any attempt to take distributional effects into 
account, either between different individuals at given point of time, or between different 
generations of individuals. It is an established fact that the incidence of corruption falls 
disproportionately on the poor (see Gupta et al., 2002): they rely more on public services (e.g., 
schools and health facilities) than the rich and thus suffer more from the reduction in the quantity 
and quality of provision caused by corruption. This could be captured by introducing 
distributional weights in the calculation of genuine investment. All of these adjustments can, in 
principle, be made but are very labor intensive. However, they should be placed high on the 
future research agenda. 
 
It is difficult draw concrete policy conclusions from a macro-level study of the kind conduced 
here. Such specific advice must come from micro-level evidence on the effects of particular 
policy measures. Nevertheless, one can point to general insights of policy relevance that emerge 
from the analysis. Most obviously, the message that the paper tries to send to policy makers 
thinking about what to do about corruption is that the issue is not so much what corruption does 
(or does not do) to the economic growth of a country; the real issue is that rampant corruption 
endangers sustainable development. As a consequence, reform effects, both in terms of concrete 
anti-corruption policies and in terms of governance reforms, should be directed at weeding out 
corrupt practices that reduce the incentive to protect and preserve the capital base. This includes 
control of corruption in relation to exploration of natural assets with high social value and in the 
enforcement of environmental regulation. It also includes policies aimed at preventing corruption 
and rent-seeking in the allocation of public funds for education, as well as policies that weed out, 
or reduce, the “corruption tax” on domestic and international investment flows. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis 
   
Variable   Years Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
       
Growth in Genuine wealth per capita 1996-1999 148 -0.16 2.56 -12.46 5.01 
ICRG Index 1996-1999 140 2.80 1.21 0.00 5.35 
Democracy 1996-1999 132 17.56 22.20 0.00 65.00 
Political Freedom 1996-1999 133 3.51 2.19 0.00 6.00 
GDP per capita 1996-1999 128 0.80 0.81 0.00 3.45 
Human capital 1996-1999 100 6.17 2.78 0.76 11.89 
Trade Openness 1996-1999 125 39.68 22.22 1.96 147.65
       
Growth in Genuine wealth per capita 2000-2003 146 -0.22 2.60 -13.57 5.49 
ICRG Index 2000-2003 140 3.31 1.13 0.00 5.69 
Democracy 2000-2003 132 21.37 23.22 0.00 70.00 
Political Freedom 2000-2003 133 3.60 2.13 0.00 6.00 
GDP per capita 2000-2003 129 0.93 0.97 0.00 4.87 
Human capital 2000-2003 100 6.43 2.80 0.84 12.05 
Trade Openness 2000-2003 123 42.84 23.13 9.37 139.12
       
Growth in Genuine wealth per capita 2004-2007 143 -0.14 2.83 -19.00 5.51 
ICRG Index 2004-2007 140 3.50 1.15 0.00 6.00 
Democracy 2004-2007 132 25.24 24.30 0.00 75.00 
Political Freedom 2004-2007 133 3.61 2.14 0.00 6.00 
GDP per capita 2004-2007 128 1.05 1.11 0.00 6.12 
Human capital 2004-2007 100 6.43 2.80 0.84 12.05 
Trade Openness 2004-2007 123 42.84 23.13 9.37 139.12
       
TI index 1996-2007 128 5.72 2.26 0.40 8.55 
WB index 1996-2007 135 0.64 0.28 0.00 1.06 
WBES index 1996-2007 70 1.87 0.88 0.16 4.22 
GCB index 1996-2007 59 12.08 11.72 0.00 52.00 
UNICRI index 1996-2007 44 8.76 8.99 0.04 31.11 
Common Law 1996-2007 130 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Inequality 1996-2007 106 40.12 9.78 24.00 63.00 
Latitude 1996-2007 133 27.56 17.59 0.00 64.80 
Ethnicity 1996-2007 114 0.45 0.28 0.00 0.91 
Notes: The definitions of the variables are provided in the main text. 
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Table 1: Genuine Investment in Selected Countries, average figures 1996-2007 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Gross 
saving 
Consump-
tion of 
fixed 
capital 
Educa-
tion 
expendi-
ture 
Damage 
from C02 
emission 
Particu-
late 
emission 
damage 
Energy 
deple-
tion 
Mineral 
deple-
tion 
Forest 
depletion
Genuine 
investment
Growth 
rate of 
per 
capita 
genuine 
wealth 
Growth 
rate of 
per 
capita 
GDP 
(1970-
2000) 
 % of 
GNI 
% of GNI % of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of 
GNI 
% of GNI % % 
India 28.43 9.33 3.93 1.41 0.68 3.10 0.50 0.78 16.56 0.88 2.79 
Brazil 15.48 11.37 4.30 0.31 0.28 2.19 1.24 0.00 4.39 -0.74 2.07 
Thailand 31.24 13.64 4.62 1.04 0.30 3.09 0.01 0.26 17.50 1.53 4.68 
Nigeria 27.85 8.85 0.85 0.66 0.78 45.57 0.00 0.06 -27.22 -6.78 0.79 
Kenya 14.08 9.54 5.82 0.41 0.18 0.00 0.05 1.35 8.37 -1.24 1.44 
USA 15.00 11.84 4.79 0.34 0.25 0.85 0.04 0.00 6.46 0.49 1.76 
UK 15.13 10.58 5.33 0.20 0.05 1.66 0.00 0.00 7.97 1.39 1.98 
Notes: Damage from CO2 emissions is based on a marginal cost of $30 per tonne. 
Sources: World Development Indicators (various years), Hamilton (2005), Aidt et al. (2008). 
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Table 2a:  Cross-tabulation of growth in genuine wealth per capita and the WB index 
 Low corruption High corruption 
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
Mongolia France  Japan 
Tunisia  Sweden  Norway 
Latvia  Belgium  Ireland 
Morocco  Denmark  Singapore 
Switzerland  Spain  Malaysia 
Cyprus  Bahamas   Czech Rep. 
Hong Kong Croatia  Portugal 
New Zealand  Canada  Luxembourg 
Netherlands  Uruguay  Austria 
Bulgaria  Turkey  Finland 
Thailand  Botswana  Germany 
Italy  Sri Lanka  Poland 
United 
Kingdom  Slovenia  Korea, Rep. 
United States  Estonia  Hungary 
Greece  Iceland   
 
Indonesia Jamaica  Lithuania  
Philippines Honduras  Panama  
Vietnam Bangladesh  Guyana  
Mexico Ukraine  Russia  
India Moldova  Albania  
Belarus Algeria
Armenia China  
El Salvador  
Romania   
Dominican 
Republic   
 
U
ns
us
ta
in
ab
le
  
Costa Rica  Jordan Saudi Arabia 
Egypt  Australia Madagascar 
Brunei 
Darussalam  Brazil 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Israel  Chile South Africa
Peru  Burkina Faso
 
Mozambique Malawi  Mali 
Syrian Iran  Haiti
Tanzania Lebanon  Guinea 
Nicaragua Gambia, The  Angola 
Argentina Niger  Ghana 
Venezuela  Paraguay  Uganda 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Sierra 
Leone 
Sudan Gabon  Bolivia
Ecuador Colombia  Kenya 
Togo Senegal  Pakistan 
Zimbabwe Ethiopia  Zambia 
Azerbaijan Congo, Rep.  
Guatemala Cameroon   
Notes: Sustainable (unsustainable) means that growth in genuine wealth per capita is positive 
(negative). High (low) corruption means a score on the WB index above (below) the median. 
Source: World Development Indicators (various years) and Kaufmann et al. (2005). 
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Table 2b:  Cross-tabulation of growth in genuine wealth per capita and the WBES index 
 Low corruption High corruption 
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
Poland Germany  Lithuania
Portugal  Bulgaria  Estonia 
Tunisia  Slovenia  Italy  
Singapore Canada  Uruguay 
 UK Spain  
Malaysia  Panama  USA 
Botswana  Honduras  Czech Republic
Sweden  Belarus   
Croatia  El Salvador  
Hungary  Russia  
 
Turkey Moldova  Ukraine 
Thailand Albania  Mexico 
France Philippines  India 
Indonesia Bangladesh  Armenia 
Dominican Republic Romania  
 
U
ns
us
ta
in
ab
le
  Trinidad and Tobago  Colombia 
South Africa  Guatemala 
Costa Rica  
Brazil   
Chile   
 
Madagascar Uganda  Cameroon 
Egypt. Pakistan  Nicaragua 
Peru Argentina  Ghana  
Ethiopia Ecuador  Bolivia  
Zambia Senegal  Zimbabwe 
Azerbaijan Haiti   
Venezuela  
Notes: Sustainable (unsustainable) means that growth in genuine wealth per capita is positive 
(negative). High (low) corruption means a score on the WBES index above (below) the median. 
Source: World Development Indicators (various years) and 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/ 
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Table 3: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita and Perceived Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Democracy 
Estimation technique: Pooled OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
Dep. Variable: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TI Index -0.30*** -0.20**     
 [-4.42] [-2.16]     
WB Index  -2.90*** -2.10**  
   [-4.70] [-2.45]   
ICRG Index     -0.032 0.13 
     [-0.31] [1.29] 
Democracy 0.0073 0.0036 0.0066 0.0022 0.029*** 0.0075 
 [1.37] [0.73] [1.11] [0.43] [4.61] [1.52] 
Common Law 0.070 -0.49** 0.025 -0.42* 0.059 -0.42* 
 [0.29] [-1.97] [0.11] [-1.70] [0.24] [-1.68] 
Inequality  0.012  0.013  0.0097 
  [0.64]  [0.67]  [0.48] 
GDP per capita  -0.46**  -0.61***  -0.17 
  [-2.12]  [-2.58]  [-0.87] 
Human Capital  0.18***  0.20***  0.27*** 
  [2.66]  [3.13]  [3.93] 
Trade Openness  0.010***  0.0095***  0.011*** 
  [3.38]  [3.09]  [3.56] 
       
Observations 310 230 322 233 322 233 
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.57 
Number of 
countries 
106 78 110 79 110 79 
Notes: All estimations include a full set of regional dummies, time-specific fixed effects and a 
constant term. Robust z-statistics are given in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita and Perceived Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Political Freedom 
Estimation technique: Pooled OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
Dep. Variable: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TI Index -0.30*** -0.22**     
 [-4.28] [-2.46]     
WB Index  -2.83*** -2.43***  
   [-4.69] [-2.87]   
ICRG Index     -0.080 0.11 
     [-0.74] [1.11] 
Political Freedom 0.11* -0.040 0.089 -0.080 0.27*** 0.0072 
 [1.66] [-0.50] [1.31] [-1.01] [3.46] [0.087] 
Common Law 0.11 -0.45* 0.065 -0.39 0.25 -0.37 
 [0.45] [-1.88] [0.28] [-1.63] [1.04] [-1.49] 
Inequality  0.012  0.013  0.011 
  [0.64]  [0.65]  [0.52] 
GDP per capita  -0.40*  -0.58**  -0.084 
  [-1.81]  [-2.38]  [-0.40] 
Human Capital  0.18***  0.21***  0.28*** 
  [2.77]  [3.27]  [4.10] 
Trade Openness  0.010***  0.0097***  0.011*** 
  [3.29]  [3.01]  [3.46] 
       
Observations 310 230 322 233 322 233 
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.57 
Number of 
countries 
106 78 110 79 110 79 
Notes: All estimations include a full set of regional dummies, time-specific fixed effects and a 
constant term. Robust z-statistics are given in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita and Experienced Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Democracy 
Estimation technique: Pooled OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
Dep. Variable: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
WBES index -0.90*** -0.44**     
 [-5.30] [-2.31]     
GCB Index  -0.022** -0.031***  
   [-2.24] [-3.33]   
UNICRI Index     -0.061*** -0.035* 
     [-2.93] [-1.95] 
Democracy 0.020*** 0.015** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.018 
 [3.35] [2.45] [4.45] [3.65] [2.14] [1.59] 
Common Law -0.52** -0.63** -0.29 -0.90*** -1.28*** -1.47*** 
 [-2.06] [-2.42] [-1.18] [-4.61] [-3.05] [-2.95] 
Inequality  0.028  -0.029***  0.040 
  [1.47]  [-3.13]  [1.41] 
GDP per capita  0.19  -0.063  -0.17 
  [0.80]  [-0.36]  [-0.57] 
Human Capital  0.12*  0.053  0.17** 
  [1.84]  [1.03]  [1.98] 
Trade Openness  0.0061  0.0084***  0.0030 
  [1.14]  [2.68]  [0.47] 
       
Observations 192 154 159 128 125 101 
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.79 0.54 0.57 
Number of 
countries 
65 52 55 44 42 34 
Notes: All estimations include a full set of regional dummies, time-specific fixed effects and a 
constant term. Robust  z-statistics are presented in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
47 
 
 
 
Table 6: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita and Experienced Corruption, 1996-2007: 
Specification with Political Freedom 
Estimation technique: Pooled OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
Dep. Variable: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
WBES index -0.96*** -0.41**     
 [-5.47] [-2.21]     
GCB Index  -0.034*** -0.035***  
   [-2.66] [-3.37]   
UNICRI Index     -0.075*** -0.037** 
     [-3.99] [-2.21] 
Political Freedom 0.16*** 0.21** 0.036 0.013 0.042 0.15 
 [2.70] [2.42] [0.50] [0.21] [0.72] [1.06] 
Common Law -0.36 -0.52** -0.073 -0.76*** -0.85** -1.06** 
 [-1.47] [-2.06] [-0.29] [-3.26] [-2.02] [-2.14] 
Inequality  0.035*  -0.022**  0.035 
  [1.84]  [-2.36]  [1.20] 
GDP per capita  0.26  0.14  -0.038 
  [0.99]  [0.73]  [-0.12] 
Human Capital  0.11  0.075  0.20** 
  [1.48]  [1.31]  [2.22] 
Trade Openness  0.0041  0.0083**  0.0045 
  [0.84]  [2.29]  [0.72] 
       
Observations 192 154 159 128 125 101 
R-squared 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.76 0.52 0.56 
Number of 
countries 
65 52 55 44 42 34 
Notes: All estimations include a full set of regional dummies, time-specific fixed effects and a 
constant term. Robust z-statistics are presented in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita and Corruption, 1996-2007: The Hausman-
Taylor Estimator with Democracy 
Estimation technique: Hausman-Taylor Random Effects Estimator, treating Corruption and 
Democracy as endogenous 
Dep. Variable: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TI Index -1.04***      
 [-3.36]      
WB Index  -10.4***     
  [-4.08]     
ICRG Index   -0.17*    
   [-1.72]    
WBES Index    -2.98***   
    [-4.13]   
GCB Index     -0.28***  
     [-3.07]  
UNICRI Index      -0.21*** 
      [-2.83] 
Democracy -0.011 -0.032 0.055*** 0.010 -0.026 -0.0079 
 [-0.38] [-1.12] [3.49] [0.36] [-0.74] [-0.25] 
Common Law -0.84* -0.44 -1.01* 0.67 -0.75 -1.00 
 [-1.96] [-0.94] [-1.78] [0.92] [-0.97] [-1.43] 
Inequality -0.046** -0.034 -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.077** -0.042* 
 [-2.12] [-1.48] [-3.21] [-3.78] [-2.12] [-1.66] 
GDP per capita -1.24*** -1.23*** -0.99*** -1.68*** -1.26*** -0.80* 
 [-4.01] [-3.84] [-3.42] [-3.58] [-4.25] [-1.89] 
Trade Openness 0.0054 0.0060 0.0039 -0.0058 0.012 -0.018 
 [0.88] [0.94] [0.58] [-0.68] [1.35] [-1.54] 
       
Observations 279 285 285 187 150 125 
Number of 
countries 
95 97 97 63 52 42 
Notes: All estimations include time-specific fixed effects and a constant term.  Z-statistics are 
presented in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita and Corruption, 1996-2007: The Hausman-
Taylor Estimator with Political Freedom 
Estimation technique: Hausman-Taylor Random Effects Estimator, treating Corruption and 
Political Freedom as endogenous 
Dep. Variable: Growth in Genuine Wealth per Capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TI Index -0.93***      
 [-5.36]      
WB Index  -7.94***     
  [-5.53]     
ICRG Index   -0.17*    
   [-1.74]    
WBES Index    -3.20***   
    [-4.95]   
GCB Index     -0.24***  
     [-5.33]  
UNICRI Index      -0.20*** 
      [-3.91] 
Political Freedom 0.02 0.01 0.11 -0.05 -0.14 -0.005 
 [0.21] [0.12] [1.43] [-0.60] [-1.59] [-0.042] 
Common Law -0.91** -0.70* -0.43 0.82 -1.04* -1.08* 
 [-2.35] [-1.83] [-0.87] [1.23] [-1.67] [-1.94] 
Inequality -0.050** -0.045** -0.083*** -0.11*** -0.087*** -0.044** 
 [-2.56] [-2.33] [-3.39] [-3.65] [-2.89] [-2.06] 
GDP per capita -1.26*** -1.31*** -0.27 -1.60*** -1.34*** -0.87*** 
 [-4.21] [-4.28] [-1.28] [-3.81] [-4.77] [-2.73] 
Trade Openness 0.0057 0.0077 0.0012 -0.0069 0.015* -0.016* 
 [0.96] [1.27] [0.18] [-0.85] [1.73] [-1.66] 
       
Observations 279 285 285 187 150 125 
Number of 
countries 
95 97 97 63 52 42 
Notes: All estimations include time-specific time effects and a constant term.  Z-statistics are 
presented in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Instrumental Variables Estimates (2SLS) 
Endogenous variable: Corruption  
Instruments: Latitude, Initial ICRG Index, and ethnicity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stage 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 
Dep. Variable Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
TI index Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
WB index Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
ICRG 
index 
Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
WBES 
index 
         
TI index, instrumented -0.47**        
 [-2.57]        
WB Index, instrumented   -3.93***      
   [-2.83]      
ICRG index, instrumented     -0.44    
     [-1.18]    
WBES index, instrumented       -2.72**  
       [-2.10]  
Democracy -0.0021 -0.04*** -0.0016 -0.01*** 0.016 -0.02*** -0.028 -0.011** 
 [-0.13] [-4.50] [-0.10] [-5.33] [0.95] [-4.58] [-1.16] [-2.03] 
Common law 0.099 -0.78** 0.30 -0.067** 0.38 0.045 0.075 -0.33 
 [0.20] [-2.63] [0.75] [-2.01] [0.96] [0.24] [0.072] [-1.12] 
Latitude  -0.035*  -0.0044*  -0.0067  -0.0017 
  [-1.76]  [-1.97]  [-0.93]  [-0.17] 
Initial ICRG index  0.49**  0.055**  0.37***  0.11 
  [2.18]  [2.40]  [3.94]  [0.72] 
Ethnicity  0.54  0.060  -0.35  0.75 
  [0.66]  [0.61]  [-0.79]  [1.05] 
         
OLS estimate -0.36***  -3.40***  -0.13  -0.67*  
 [-3.20]  [-3.80]  [-0.60]  [-1.84]  
First stage F-statistics 12.11 14.79 12.1 2.19 
Over-ID test (p-value) 0.33 0.12 0.03 0.63 
Observations 86 86 96 96 96 96 51 51 
R-squared 0.43 0.75 0.51 0.76 0.44 0.65 0.36 0.41 
Notes: Robust z-statistics are presented in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all estimations contain regional dummy variables.
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Table 10: Instrumental Variables Estimates (2SLS): The “Hierarchies of Institutions” Hypothesis 
Endogenous variables: Corruption 
Instruments: Democracy, Common Law, Latitude, Initial ICRG Index and ethnicity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stage 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 
Dep. Variable Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
TI index Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
WB index Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
ICRG 
index 
Growth in 
genuine 
wealth 
WBES 
index 
         
TI index, instrumented -0.45***        
 [-5.25]        
WB Index, instrumented   -3.93***      
   [-5.75]      
ICRG index, instrumented     -0.84***    
     [-4.90]    
WBES index, instrumented       -1.60***  
       [-3.29]  
Democracy  -0.037***  -
0.0048***
 -0.020***  -0.011** 
  [-4.50]  [-5.33]  [-4.58]  [-2.03] 
Common law  -0.78**  -0.067**  0.045  -0.33 
  [-2.63]  [-2.01]  [0.24]  [-1.12] 
Latitude  -0.035*  -0.0044*  -0.0067  -0.0017 
  [-1.76]  [-1.97]  [-0.93]  [-0.17] 
Initial ICRG index  0.49**  0.055**  0.37***  0.11 
  [2.18]  [2.40]  [3.94]  [0.72] 
Ethnicity  0.54  0.060  -0.35  0.75 
  [0.66]  [0.61]  [-0.79]  [1.05] 
         
First stage F-statistics  46.32  58.77  21.47  5.21 
Over-ID test 0.66  0.35 0.15  0.43  
Observations 86 86 96 96 96 96 51 51 
R-squared 0.43 0.75 0.50 0.76 0.38 0.65 0.19 0.41 
Notes: Robust z-statistics are presented in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all estimations contain regional dummy variable.
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